Loyola University Chicago, School of Law

LAW eCommons
Faculty Publications & Other Works

2007

New Governance and Health Care Regulation.
John D. Blum
Loyola University Chicago, jblum@luc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/facpubs
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Blum, John D., New Governance and Health Care Regulation, 2 Asian J. WTO & Int’l Health L. & Pol’y 125 (2007).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications & Other Works
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

NEW GOVERNANCE AND HEALTH CARE
REGULATION

John D. Blum*

ABSTRACT
This paper explores a new approach to health care regulation,
referred to generally as new governance. New governance is not a
unitary theory of law but rather is a collection of approaches to
regulation which lie between an open market system and a very
prescriptive regulatory regime, often characterized as command

and control regulation. Originally developed in Australia, the
various approachesto new governance have been implemented in
Europe and North America as well, generally in highly technical
arenasin matters concerningsafety and the environment The paper
considers the application of new governance in health care,
primarily in the context of medical errors, but also considers
applicationso this doctrine to licensure as well.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In the context of health care delivery there are multiple elements,
which are brought to bear in the broad structure of a given system, as well
as in its operational details. There is a growing awareness of the role of law
as a core element in health care, both to define the structure and operations
of a system, as well as to recognize and protect the rights of individuals
involved in that system. The focus of this article is on one aspect of law as
it touches on health, the role of regulation. Generally, regulation is thought
of in reference to a given program or initiative, but in the context of this
paper, regulation will be looked at more broadly as a tool that can assist
governments with enhancing the oversight of current programs, as well as a
mechanism that can facilitate necessary systemic changes. This paper will
address an emerging area of administrative law, new governance, a broad
generic term that encompasses a series of reform efforts designed to
promote a more responsive and flexible regulatory structure. While the
consideration of new governance may be somewhat broad in nature, this
stream of legal theory will be considered in the context of hospital
regulation and more specifically in reference to the ongoing problem of
medical errors in the acute care setting and the debate over charity care
obligations of non-profit hospitals. While the basis of analysis will be
drawn from the United States, the applications of new governance models
can extend to any regulated health system.
II. BACKGROUND

While individual legal regimes approach health care regulation in
different ways, most regulatory schemes will fit into one of four areas:
command and control, the use of economic instruments, self-regulation and
voluntarism. 1 Command and control is the most familiar style of
government regulation as it entails development and enforcement of legal
mandates through statues and supporting administrative policies, and as
such, is a system of direct government control over a particular issue. The
use of economic instruments rests on government policies that reward or
penalize behaviors by creating financial incentives to leverage performance.
Self-regulation entails the development of control mechanisms by the
regulated that determine both the standards to be applied, as well as the
manner of enforcement. A typical process here would be accreditation.
Voluntarism is based on an entity or individual behaving in a responsible
manner on their own volition, without any public or private oversight. It is
1

See generally NEIL CUNNINGHAM & PETER GARBOSKY, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING
ENVIRONMENTAL PoLIcY 424-26 (1998).
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within this fourfold universe that legal theorists are beginning to posit new
approaches to the regulation of the health sector based on the premise that
none of the four models mentioned are independently, or collectively,
satisfactory. Legal scholars have argued that the four approaches noted
must be altered to fit current and future realities of governance, as well as
health care delivery.2
III. NEW GOVERNANCE MODELS
It is thus a reaction against traditional regulation, most typically
commands and control, that has spawned a series of related legal regulatory
models, collectively referred to as new governance.3 Broadly defined, new
governance is a legal development, which calls for greater flexibility in the
approaches governments take in controlling particular sectors of activity
whether it be health, environment or criminal justice, etc. It is not a
rejection of regulation per se, but new governance is rooted in concepts of
law that are tailored to individual actors and problems, while still retaining
the option to use more direct legal mandates for areas of persistent
difficulty. In some ways new governance models can be analogized to a
form of public contracts between regulator and the regulated party. Part of
the challenge in developing a general sense of new governance is that the
nomenclature, which accompanies theories in this area, often varies.
Perhaps the most established model of new governance is responsive
regulation, a concept that was developed by Australian legal scholars.
Responsive regulation is a form of government oversight that envisions
regulated parties negotiating enforceable conditions with the regulator, the
creation of a hierarchy of sanctions, that match the degree of infringement,
and thirdly, crafting a role in decision making and monitoring for members
of the public.4
In addition to responsive regulation, Australian academics have posited
two other forms of new governance: meta-regulation and restorative justice.
Meta-regulation is a form of regulation in which a regulated entity focuses
its efforts on solving a given problem that may be identified by government,
or may reflect a self-recognition on the part of the regulated of a particular
2 See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE ET AL., THE GOVERNANCE OF HEALTH SAFETY AND
QUALITY: A DiscussIoN PAPER (2005).

3 In 2002, the American Hospital Association convened a taskforce on regulation that identified
seven models of regulation in the American hospital context, command and control, public utility
regulation, inspection, reporting and disclosure, performance-based regulation, delegated
regulation and market-based regulation, which is actually quite close to the fourfold classification
noted in this article that came out of the new governance area. See generally Am. Hosp. Sass's.
Taskforce on Regulation Relief and Reform, Final Report, App.E, Hospital Regulation (2002).
4 See generally LAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1995).
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issue that has resulted in problems. Meta-regulation allows individuals and
entities to devise solutions to a given problem based upon their own
creativity and logic, an approach that may be highly tailored by a given
actor, and possibly not result in a solution of general applicability across an
industry. Restorative justice looks at a law as a vehicle to heal those
impacted by problems, and the process of healing is not punitive, but rather
involves a candid admission about the nature and causes of a given problem,
and requires genuine introspection on the part of regulated to learn from
past mistakes. Another form of new governance crafted in the American
context is management based regulation, which includes elements from
responsive and meta-regulation. Management based regulation is a
mechanism that directs regulated entities to engage in planning processes
that are self determined to meet a particular public goal. Unlike two other
traditional means of industry regulation (technology-based regulation,
which intervenes at the action stage of organizational behavior, and
performance-based regulation, that concerns outputs), management-based
regulation is focused on planning. The rationale underlying regulatory
intervention at the planning stage is that sound planning will spark good
internal management, resulting in achievement of both private and public
goals. The planning process is heavily dependent on information, and the
nature and type of information used in planning may be largely
self-determined by the regulated entity. Uses of information in management
-based regulation for planning purposes are distinguished from the
information mandates of collection and disclosure that are so prevalent in
institutional health care regulation. It should be noted that
management-based regulation and the other new governance models noted
are not just theoretical constructs, but have been applied in various ways in
national legal systems in health care and other sectors. For example,
management-based regulation can be seen in occupational health, food
safety and pollution prevention; responsive regulation and restorative
justice are evident in various criminal and civil law contexts respectively.
Before focusing on applications of new governance in health care, it is
important to consider why the search for alternative models of regulation,
outside of command and control methods, is compelling. While a detailed
overview of health care regulation in the United States is beyond the scope
of this article, review of this area quickly leads to the conclusion that its
both voluminous and costly. Health care regulation in the United States,
dominated by command and control models, can be characterized on its
own as a major enterprise, estimated to cost close to $340 billion dollars6
annually, constituting a tax of $1,500 on the average American family.
5 See generally Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management Based regulation: Prescribing

PrivateManagementto Achieve Public Goals, 37 L & Soc'Y REv. 691 (2003).
6 See generally Christopher Conover, Health Care Regulation, A $169 Billion Hidden Tax, 527
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Cost estimates of the regulatory system in American health care reflects the
scope of activities made up by extensive sets of mandates existing at local,
regional and national levels of government, covering virtually all aspects of
the delivery system. In addition, there are also very active private
regulatory entities, such as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Health Organizations (JCAHO) which have great influence as well, and
add further complexity to the regulatory arena.7 Compliance activities
consume large amounts of time and resources for both individual and
institutional providers alike.
The typical reaction of public authorities to problems in the delivery
system is to enact new laws or issue regulations, creating a layering effect
of requirements, with a lack of coordination between new and existing
mandates. Even with the passage of laws or issuance of regulations, which
create new oversight initiatives, existing rules in similar or related areas
may not be abandoned. Ultimately the issue of assessing regulations is not
one of just cost and volume, but determining whether a given regulation is
effectiveness in meeting stated goals. In the abstract it is difficult to argue
the pros and cons of the health regulatory regimes in the U.S., but the
current enterprise is challenged by serious quality, cost and access issues
appear not to be addressed through massive regulatory oversight. 8 Also
troublesome is that given the costs of the American health system generally
and in the area of regulation, it falls short in several key public health
indicators compared to other OECD nations.9 Some health policy experts
argue in the face of ineffective regulatory schemes that government
oversight would be better replaced by free market mechanisms, but that
position is also problematic in that incentives here may not necessarily
protect public interests. 10 Enhancement of individual and population health
is a government responsibility, and such an obligation must be grounded in
law and process. The tools of law must be carefully applied, as both a
matter of infrastructure and a mechanism to facilitate general and specific
health goals. Regulation is not an end onto itself, and as such in the United

CATO INsTrr. POL'Y ANALYsis 3 (2004). A newly issued study on health care costs generally
which projects that American health care spending will double in the next decade, consuming close
to 20% of the GDP, see John Poisal et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2016: Modest
Changes Obscure Part D's Impact, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/contentlfull/hlthaff.26.2.w

242vl/DC1
7 See The Joint Commission, http://www.jointcommission.org
a See generally, e.g., Peter V. Lee & Emma Hoo, Beyond Consumer-Driven Health Care:
PurchasersExpectations of All Health Plans, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 544 (2006). This short piece
focuses on the development of consumer driven health care in the U.S., but is a good example of
how core underlying problems in the American system need to be addresses.
9 See OECD Health Data 2006: How Does the United States Compare, http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/29/52/36960035.pdf (last visited Feb 22, 2007).
10 See e.g. John Cogan, A Healthy Debate: Health Care Reform, http://www.hoover.org/
publications/uk/2934081.html (last visited Feb 22, 2007).
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States, as well as other nations, the effectiveness of any regulatory scheme
must be a continual matter of study and necessary changes to reform legal
tools must be pursued.
IV. MOVING NEW GOVERNANCE INTO HEALTH
A. Medical Errors
In 1999 the Institute of Medicine (IOM), a non-governmental research
group, issued its now famous report "To Err is Human", which was an
indictment leveled against American hospitals.11 The IOM Report noted
that between 44,000 to 98,000 patients died in U.S. hospitals as a result of
preventable errors. The Report generated considerable controversy as some
argued that the assessment lacked rigor, and as a result, the numbers of
preventable deaths were grossly inflated. Others argued that the number of
preventable deaths in American hospitals, caused by preventable errors, is
much higher, perhaps over 200,000. 2 To a great extent, the merits of the
IOM Report have almost become secondary to the wide spread recognition
in the United States, the United Kingdom., Canada and Australia, in
particular, that the number of preventable medical errors in hospital is far
too high, and that appropriate measures must be taken to address this
problem. In the American context, the "medical error epidemic" is laced
with irony in that the U.S. tort system is very active in the acute care arena,
and in addition, the hospital sector has been subjected to multiple public
and private quality regulations.
The initial IOM Report, and similar analyses, has sparked considerable
introspection in hospital and medical communities in the developed world.
Significant efforts have gone into identifying medical errors, analyzing the
causes of such errors and developing medical treatment guidelines to
prevent future mistakes. 14 Practices from other industries to identify and
control errors were mirrored in health care, particularly those adopted by
the aviation field. Even before the IOM Report, the U.S. Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) had developed a
1 See generally LINDA T. KOHN ET AL. EDS., To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM (2000).
"See generally HEALTH GRADES, HEALTH GRADES QUALITY STUDY: PATIENT SAFETY IN
AMERICAN HosPrrALs (2004), http://www.healthgrades.com/media/english/pdf/HGPatient_

SafetyStudyFinal.pdf (last visited Feb 4, 2006). For an alternative view of the medical error
issue, see generally Maxine M. Harrington, Revisiting Medical Error: Five Years After the IOM
Report, Have Reporting Systems made a measurable Difference, 15 HEALTH MATRiX 329 (2005).
13 See BRAITHWArrE, supra note 2, at 16-19.
14 See generally Barry R. Furrow, Medical Mistakes: Tiptoeing Toward Safety, 3 Hous. J. HEALTH
L & POL'Y 181 (2003); Brian A. Liang, The Adverse Event of UnaddressedMedical Error:
Identifying and Filling in the Holes in the Health Careand Legal Systems, 29 J. L. MED.& ETHICS
346 (2001).
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system for identifying, voluntarily reporting, and analyzing hospital based
medical errors.' Another private group, the National Quality Forum
(NQF), endorsed 27 safety practices that should be used in applicable
clinical settings to reduce the risk of harm to patients. The NQF safety
practices include use of eleven recommendations for specific clinical care
processes, seven recommendations for information transfer and
communications, as well as recommendations for the use of physician order
entry systems (CPOE), and evidence based referrals for high-risk
procedures.' 6
From a regulatory standpoint, the medical error crisis lead to a variety
of responses in the United States. At the national level, a series of activities
occurred among a number of health care agencies motivated by a need for
greater public accountability in the face of this problem: the creation of a
knowledge base concerning errors and the promotion of cultural changes at
the institutional level that involved considerable focus on identifying and
correcting deficiencies in patient care. Federal legislation was enacted in
2005 to establish regional Patient Safety Organizations to voluntarily
collect reported data on medical errors from physicians and other providers,
analyze this data to discern patterns and trends, and feed the data into a
national database. 17 In addition to federal activity, regional governments,
states, became very active in responding to medical errors occurring in
hospitals in their respective jurisdictions. By 2002, 20 states had enacted
legislation mandating the reporting of adverse events as part of their
hospital licensing requirements. Minnesota became the first of several
states to require that the list of 27 adverse events measures developed by
the National Quality Forum (NQF), referred to as "never events", be
reported to the Minnesota Department of Health. 19 Pennsylvania, another
pioneering state in the medical error area, established a special government
agency, the Patient Safety Authority, to deal with medical error problems.20
Interestingly enough, in the midst of policy changes and new
regulatory initiatives occurring as a result of the medical error crisis, a
response to these issues was crafted by the U.S. Centers for Medicare and
15 JCAHO,

Sentinel Event Policy and Procedures, http://www.jointcomnmission.org/Sentinel

Events/PolicyandProcedures/ (last visited Jan 25,2007).
16

See generally THE NATIONAL QUALITY FORUM, SAFE PRACTICES FOR BETTER HEALTHCARE:

A CONSENSUS REPORT (2003).
17 Patient Safety and Quality Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-41 (2005).
1s See generally JILL ROSENTHAL & MAUREEN BOOTH, DEFINING REPORTABLE ADVERSE
EVENTS: A GUIDE FOR STATES TRACKING MEDICAL ERRORS (2003), http://www.nashp.org/
Files/GNL50.pdf
19Minnesota Medical Association, Pawley, Hanovich, Attend Ceremonial Signing of Adverse
Events Law, http://www.mmaonline.net/News/fullstory,cfm?recNum=2807 (last visited Feb 22,
2007).
20Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act, 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§1303.303 (West 2004).
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Medicaid Services (CMS), which fits into the area of new governance.
More specifically, one regulatory program developed as a way to enhance
medical quality and thus reduce errors, the Quality Assessment
Performance Improvement (QAPI), appears by chance to mirror new
governance approaches, and can be characterized as a form of
management-based regulation referred to earlier in the article. Specifically,
the QAPI program imposes four sets of requirements on hospitals: first, the
development of an ongoing, hospital-wide program that measures reduction
in medical errors; second, a clearly defined policy on supporting data to
identify and measure quality; third, a priority-setting process for
improvements that tracks and analyzes adverse patient events and
implements preventive actions; and fourth, the implementation of quality
improvement projects proportional to the scope and complexity of a given
hospital's services. 21 Like the new governance model, management-based
regulation, QAPI is a planning model, which allows for considerable
discretion on the part of the regulated hospital to design its own program to
address error problems that are particular to the institution. In keeping with
new governance generally, QAPI does not abandon regulation, as it is not
an open-ended control mechanism just as the regulator, CMS, does not
dismiss the possibility of more prescriptive controls, should self initiated
processes fail. The QAPI regulations place responsibility for program
operations on hospital leadership (board, medical staff), and individual
institutional programs must be evaluated as part of the CMS regulatory
certification processes. Even with flexibility, major failures in designing an
error reduction program could lead to termination of federal
reimbursement. 22
It is unlikely that CMS thought consciously about new governance
when it designed the QAPI program, but certainly it was an effort created
to spark creativity in problem identification and response. Even with
considerable introspection concerning medical errors, there continues to be
a need to better define the scope of these problems and to identify viable
solutions, which are feasible in individual circumstances. The QAPI model,
to some degree, is taken from earlier regulatory initiatives in the U.S.
nursing home industry in a program that made more reimbursement
available for homes that developed innovative approaches to achieving
higher quality of services. 23 The major test for QAPI is whether a
regulatory agency, CMS, which has a strong tradition of command and
control regulation, and a culture which supports prescriptive intervention,
will tolerate a new approach to regulatory control, which is far more fluid
21 See Conditions of Participation for Hospital Quality Assessment and Performance Improvement,

68 Fed. Reg. 3438-39.
22 See id. at 3435, 3443 and 3446.
23

See BRAIHWArrE supra note 2, at 23.
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and less defined. In fact, the greatest challenges faced by those invoking
new governance approaches will be to successfully integrate such
approaches into existing government regimes that are highly directive,
underpinned by legal requirements which not only support, but require
considerable oversight over given activities. As noted, the QAPI program
discussed is structured in such a way that if the flexibility model wanes,
traditional command and control mechanisms are readily available to be
drawn upon, but this dependence on traditional regulation is not outside the
concepts of new governance.
B. Licensure and Charity Care
New governance approaches in health care regulation should also be
considered as vehicles to do more than offer regulators another avenue
among a menu of traditional oversight formats. Rather, new governance
avenues present possibilities for major shifts in the way regulators exercise
authority over regulated entities. One possible arena to consider regulatory
alterations in health regulation can be found in the case of hospital
licensure. Licensure stands out as perhaps the most basic form of health
care institutional control.24 In the American context, hospitals (as well as
other institutional health providers) have been subjected to state licensure
requirements since the 1920s. In general, hospital licensure establishes a
baseline set of requirements for entry into the acute care sector, and ensures
an ongoing compliance with operational mandates. By and large licensure
is not an area likely to be characterized as progressive regulation, but rather
represents a fundamental exercise of state police powers directed toward
fundamental public health goals. Parallel to licensure is the Medicare
(elderly health care insurance run by the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid (CMS)) certification process which, through state licensing
authorities, applies a separate set of standards to hospitals, known as the
Conditions of Participation.2 Perhaps the most significant level of hospital
oversight is the application of private sector standards under the auspices of
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO).

None of the three hospital control processes noted (licensure,
Conditions of Participation, JCAHO accreditation) are static, but old
requirements are updated and new requirements are added with changes in
24 See generally Mitchell J. Wiet, Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital and its

Legacy, 14 ANNALS OF HEALTH LAW 399 (2005); see also John D. Blum, Feng Shui and the
restructuringof the Hospital Corporation:A Call for Change in the Face of the medical Error
Epidemic, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 5, 13 (2003).
2 Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) on Hospital Conditions of Participation (COP), 42
C.F.R. §482.1-482.66 (2006).
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medicine, technology and health delivery. Of the three processes,
JCAHO accreditation tends to be the most flexible, allowing for some
collaboration with the regulated, encompassing a goals-oriented approach,
evaluation reflected in highly
as opposed to a stringent compliance
- 27
prescriptive government evaluations. While JCAHO displays far more
creativity in its approaches to hospital regulation, it is at most a
quasi-public body and as such, lacks the ultimate authority of a government
agency.
The core regulations, the state hospital licensing statutes, often are
poorly harmonized with other legal mandates, and may reflect haphazard
attempts to deal with immediate problems. More importantly, in a highly
regulated sector, licensure is taken as a "given", but is not viewed as a tool
to create more effective and meaningful oversight. A redesigned licensure
process could, however, become a mechanism to implement creative
approaches to regulation, and this maybe accomplished through application
of new governance models. A responsive regulatory model could be applied
to hospital licensure, combining elements of flexibility with retained,
traditional baseline requirements. The retained core elements of licensure
would ensure that all acute care facilities met standard operational
mandates, but beyond that, regulators could negotiate additional
requirements that would be both measurable and tailored to a given facility.
Hospital licensure would no longer be composed of a uniform set of
verifiable elements, but would be adjusted by regulators in ways that
promote health needs of populations served by given institutions, and thus,
contain variable mandates.
One example of how a responsive regulation model would operate in
the hospital licensure context can be illustrated by reference to the current
28
U.S. controversy concerning charity care. Most American hospitals are
non-profit entities, exempt from property, sales and income taxes. In order
for hospitals to retain their tax exempt status, they must provide a
community benefit; typically, but not exclusively measured by the
provision of charity (free) care. 29 There is an ongoing controversy
(manifest at local, regional and national levels of government) that is
focused on allegations that hospitals are failing to provide requisite charity
26

See, e.g. Illinois Hospital Licensing Act, 210 ILCS 85/1-16 (2006) and the Georgia Regulation

of Hospitals and Other Related Institutions O.C.G.A. §§ 31-7-1 to -16 (2006); both of which are
reflective of changes in this area.
27 Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, http://www.JointCommission.org/Standards

/Requirements (last visited Jan 23, 2007).
2s See generally Jack E. Karns, Justifying the Non-Profit Hospital: Tax Exemption in a
Competitive Market Environment, 13 WIDENER LAW JOURNAL 383 (2004).
29 See Provena Covenant Medical Center v. Illinois Department of Revenue, fI1. Cir. Ct. No.

2006MR00597, appeal filed 10/26/06. This is currently a leading case dealing with the variables
needs to qualify for tax exemption in this case under state law.
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care to warrant their tax exempt status. This dispute has resulted in various
attempts to clarify the vagaries surrounding the law that defines community
obligations. But creation of uniform standards is not only illusive, but
perhaps not desirable. Rather, the public maybe better served by a new
governance, responsive regulatory approach to charity care that allows
regulators to negotiate with individual facilities concerning the specific
community benefits that they must provide to retain their non-profit status.
As licensed entities, hospitals are inherently imbued with a public health
mission, and their tax status only serves to further reinforce such a
mission. ° Thus, it is reasonable for regulators to be proactive in ensuring
that a hospital's charity obligations are linked to the public health needs of
the communities that given hospitals serve. Use of responsive regulation in
licensure affords a vehicle for state authorities to develop specific service
obligations that serve public health goals in a more meaningful way. In
addition, the element of public participation can be built into a responsive
regulatory model to address charity care in that the constituencies can be
formally involved in the administrative process that delineates explicit
service obligations.
C. CautionaryNotes
Changes in the format of regulatory law, such as those proposed under
the auspices of new governance, should be considered to introduce
efficiencies into legal processes, with the ultimate goal of creating a more
optimal match between legislation and administrative implementation. No
significant alteration of the established legal order ought to be undertaken
lightly, and as such, a high burden must be placed on the part of reformers
to justify particular reform initiatives as being both practical and efficient.
As such, changes wrought by adoption of new governance models must be
critically assessed, and regulatory tests such as cost benefit analysis, as well
as other impact assessments, must be performed. Changes in the regulatory
order will be expensive, for both government and industry, and so there
needs to be adequate resources available, as well as consensus on the part
of both the regulator and the regulated that proposed changes are necessary
and feasible. A major barrier in any regulatory scheme is a persistent lack
of trust among key parties, which places an even greater burden on
regulatory reformers to justify new initiatives. 3 1 New governance is not a

"magic bullet" but rather offers a series of approaches to regulation less
rigid than traditional models of administrative oversight, and allows for a
30 An interesting discussion of the quasi-public nature of the licensed hospital can be found in the

New Jersey Supreme Court case of Griesman v. Newcomb Hospital, 192 A. 2d 817 (N.J.1963).
See generally Neil McLaughlin, Trust, that valuable, fragile asset, 32 MODERN HEALTHCARE
16(2002).

31
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"bottom up" process to address given problems in a creative, less
prescriptive fashion. It would be naive, however, to suggest that new
governance, in practice, has been a universal success. In areas such as
environmental and occupational health, as well as food safety, where new
governance has been adopted, problems still persist. For example,
advocates of new governance have cited innovations in food safety as a
model for improving oversight by adoption of responsive regulation, but
serious problems in this sector continue to be uncovered, underscoring the
need for government oversight. 32 Flexibility and collaboration cannot be
allowed to erode the importance of meaningful oversight and new
governance strategies should be pursued to enhance effectiveness of
regulation, not to diminish it. Finally, most proponents of new governance
don't see such reforms as a wholesale replacement of traditional regulations,
but rather view them as options that can coexist with more traditional
sanctions that can be invoked when collaborative processes breakdown.
Still, as noted previously, regulation is a mean and not and end, and should
be adjusted to better comport to the needs of an evolving delivery system.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
New governance offers exciting approaches to government efforts to
more efficiently oversee, and in some cases, actually influence the
directions of health services. While the discussion in this article is heavily
focused on the American regulatory experience, the fact is that new
governance models apply to any national health system where the rules of
law are utilized to oversee public health matters. Other examples of new
governance applications could be seen in the adoption of restorative justice
principles to medical malpractice through the use of apology as a vehicle
both to mitigate and to foster healing. On the international side of health
law, new governance models could be applied to cut through the barriers
which exist in getting sustainable aid and needed technologies to the
developing world. In environmental health areas, the spirit of new
governance exists in the context of goals-oriented regulation, evidenced by
use of the precautionary principle, but could lead to greater flexibility in
this context as well. While new approaches to regulation offer great
potential to regulators around the globe, it is always naive to cling to a hope
that changing legal processes will be easily done. In addition, it is not
merely a matter of altering legal procedures to effectuate changes along the
lines of new governance, but the culture of regulation, rooted in
prescriptive command and control processes, must also undergo change.
32 See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 5, at 697-98; see also Annys Shin, Outbreak Reveals Food
Safety Net's Holes, WASHINGTON POST, Dec 11, 2006, at A01.
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Even in the de facto regulatory environment demonstrated by the QAPI
program, there is a built-in mechanism to revert back to more traditional
quality evaluation formats, which is not so much an outgrowth of
regulatory hierarchies, but rather a reactionary stance against changes. In
the case of hospital licensure, a complex web of control must be swept
away for a more flexible model to be implemented, and this would require
great commitment on the part of regulators to go beyond the status quo. At
the end of the day, what needs to be focused on in bringing about changes
to regulatory systems is awareness that while legal procedures are
important tools, they should not be seen as ends in and of themselves. The
ultimate goals of a regulatory scheme, such as enhancing public health,
must be the guiding force underpinning the adoption of legal process.
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